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Judges and their emotions
TERRY A MARONEY
Professor of Law, Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society, Vanderbilt
University, USA
udges are human beings; human beings have emotions; ergo, judges have emotions. The
simplicity, even banality, of this syllogism belies its potentially revolutionary nature. In legal
theory and popular opinion, the judge's humanity has long been either ignored or regarded as
a necessary evil, an unfortunate consequence of having to populate the legal system with
fallible, biased, real people. Emotion traditionally has been counted among the primary
sources of fallibility and bias. The task of the legal system, under this view, is to systematically
reduce the opportunities for judicial emotion to insert itself; the task of the good judge is to
prevent emotion from exerting any influence wherever such opportunities remain.
Understood through the lens of these negative value judgments, the simple syllogism
provides a rationale for vigilantly policing and suppressing judicial emotion. But what if
those judgments were to change? If we were appropriately to value both the judge's
humanity and the role of emotion in human life, the syllogism's implications would be
profoundly different. We would seek not to police and suppress judicial emotion in all
instances but, rather, to acknowledge, examine and sometimes even welcome it.
Revolutionary though it may be, this is the correct objective. The traditional devaluation
of judicial emotion is both misguided and destructive.
As other contributors to this special issue have no doubt demonstrated, contemporary
law and emotion studies have sought systematically to expose the assumptions about human
emotion underlying legal theory and practice, and then to examine those assumptions in
light of a sophisticated understanding of emotion itself 1 The aim of this short article is to
show how applying that methodology compels a dramatic shift in how we think about
judges and their emotions. I have explored these themes in a series of prior articles; 2 I
synthesise them here. I first trace the development of the ideal of dispassionate judging and
argue that it conflicts with virtually everything we know about emotion and its value.
Having dislodged that ideal from its comfortable post, I suggest that the proper stance
toward judicial emotion is not elimination but regulation. Judicial emotion regulation
provides a flexible structure within which emotion may be examined, accepted, changed, or
simply lived with. I then discuss the particular case of judicial anger. Anger can be either
1 Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren, 'Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?' (2010) 94 Minn L Rev 1997.
2 Terry A Maroney, 'The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion' (2011) 99 Cal L Rev 629, Terry A
Maroney, 'Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior' (2011) 99 Cal L Rev 1481, Terry A Maroney, Angry
Judges' (2012) 65 Vand L Rev 1207.
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helpful or unhelpful for judges, and therefore serves as an excellent testing ground on which
to show how regulation helps to discern and enact that difference. I close with thoughts
about directions for future research.
The project's centre of gravity is, at present, firmly in the USA. With the exception of
some insights drawn from a study of Australian magistrates, the concrete examples on
which I rely are from the US context. However, there is every reason to believe that the
model I offer would translate well to the context of the British Isles. We share a common
law heritage, including the traditional notion of dispassionate judging that long has
animated that heritage. The psychological truths that challenge that traditional notion are,
generally speaking, common to all human beings. Culture unquestionably influences how
we experience and regulate emotion; legal and cultural differences (both between Britain
and its former colonies, and among the countries of the contemporary British Isles)
therefore deserve close analysis.3 Though such analysis is not possible here, I hope that this
project will spur similar efforts in Ireland and the UK, where the study of law and emotion
- let alone its applicability to judging - remains at a relatively young stage.
Judicial dispassion: some history
Insistence on emotionless judging is a cultural ideal of unusual longevity and potency. As
long ago as the mid-1600s, none other than Thomas Hobbes declared that the ideal judge
is 'divested of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion'. 4 More than three centuries later,
US Supreme CourtJustice Sonia Sotomayor testified at her confirmation hearing that judges
'apply law to facts. We don't apply feelings to facts.' 5 After a nasty public fight over whether
Sotomayor might be unduly 'empathetic', a quality sought by US President Barack Obama,6
one journalist characterised the idea that emotion might influence judging as 'radioactive'. 7
Then and now, calling a judge 'emotional' is considered a stinging insult.8
Several converging developments in Western culture and jurisprudence - here painted
only in broad strokes - contributed to the remarkable entrenchment of the dispassionate
judge ideal. It is rooted in the European Enlightenment's insistence on a dichotomy
between emotion and reason. Sharply simplified, the Enlightenment intellectual tradition
reified rational inquiry, science and secularisation. Emotion was associated with religious
fervour, ignorance, prejudice, and reliance on epistemological sources such as tradition and
revelation, forces from which enlightened persons sought to be freed. 9 This asserted
dichotomy between reason and emotion became highly relevant to law. As law was aligned
3 See e.g. Batja Mesquita and Janxin Leu, 'The Cultural Psychology of Emotion' in Shinobu Kitayama and Dov
Cohen (eds), Handbook of CultralPcyhology (Guilford Press 2007) 734 59. The fact that the US and the British
Isles share a dominantly Western and anglophone cultural heritage suggests that cultural variation, while real,
may be relaively limited. This will be progressively less so as the cultures become more separated by ime, and
as they become less internally homogenous.
4 Thomas Hobbes, Leriathau, A R Waller (ed) (CUP 1904/1651) 203.
5 <http://judiciarysenate.gov/hearings/testimonycftn?id 3959&wit-id 515> (statement of Judge Sonia
Sotomayor).
6 Obama nomination remarks, quoted in John Hasnas, 'The Unseen Deserve Empathy Too' Wall Srreet Journal
(New York, 29 May 2009), remarks of Barack Obama (Planned Parenthood Action Fund, 17 July 2007)
<http://lauraetch.googlepages.com/barackobamabeforeplannedparenthoodaction>I Susan A Bandes,
'Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law' (2009) Cardozo L Rev De Novo 133.
7 Peter Baker, 'In Court Nominees: Is Obama Looking for Empathy by Another Name?' New York Times (New
York, 26 April 2010) A12.
8 Jeffrey Rosen, 'Sentimental Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry Blackmun' The New Republic
(Washington, 2 May 1994) 13 14.
9 Henry Farnham May, Th Enlzgh r n iv America (OUP 1976) xiv, 42.
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wit reason, it necessarily was positioned as emotion's opposite. This alignment only
strengthened as law increasingly was conceptualised as a science. 10
Interestingly, despite the Enlightenment tradition's commitment to intellectual and
political equality, its position on emotion betrayed lingering elitism; emotion came to be
associated wit the irrational beliefs and unrestrained impulses of common people.
11
Indeed, that association was on vivid display in the USA at the time of the nation's
founding.12 In the well-known words of James Madison:
It is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the
government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the
government.
13
Under tis view - a point of agreement between Hobbes and Madison -judges were critical
agents in ensuring that law acted as a bulwark against popular emotion. Judges fulfilled this
responsibility by taming the emotions of litigants, ignoring those of the public, and
divesting themselves of their own. 14 Thus, by the turn of the twentiet century, it seemed
clear that - in the words of a leading Continental theorist - emotionless judging was a
'fundamental tenet of Western jurisprudence'. 15
Then came the legal Realists. As part of their effort to shatter illusions about law's
objectivity and determinacy, Realists insisted that emotion formed part of a broader 'human
element' that inevitably shaped judging.16 Benjamin Cardozo asserted that it was impossible
to understand 'what judges really do' witout dialogue on the contrast between 'reason
versus emotion'. 17 Jerome Frank went considerably furter, drawing heavily on
psychoanalytic theory to propose that judges routinely were led astray by 'childish'
emotional drives and fantasies and should instead inspire to emotional 'maturity' (a state he
left frustratingly undefined). 18 Though their account of judicial emotion was simultaneously
muddled and tin, the Realists contributed to a more general acknowledgment that judicial
emotion exists and, contrary to the traditional party line, exerts influence. Indeed, during
the tail end of the Realist heyday in the USA, one judge bluntly wrote that emotionless
judges are 'mythical beings', like 'Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies'. 19
10 Christopher C Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Corrac t (Little Brown & Co 1871) vi.
11 May (n 9) 337.
12 Ibid 97 98.
13 The Federalist Papers 49 [lames Madison], Clinton Rossiter (ed) (New American Library 1961) 317. See also
Doni Gewirtzman, 'Our Founding Feelings' (2009) 43 U Rich L Rev 623, 637-40.
14 William J Brennan, 'Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law." (1988) 10 Cardozo L Rev 3,
Gewirtzman (n 13) 679, Richard A Posner, Fron, f of Legal Theory (Harvard University Press 2001) 226.
15 Karl Georg Wurzel, Methods of Juridical Thinking (1904), translated in Sciece of Legal Method- Seleced Essa;,
Ernest Bruncken and Layton B Register (eds) (Boston Books 1917), 298. Wurzel wrote that it was necessary
to neutralise judicial emotion because 'absence of emotion is a prerequisite of all scientific thinking' and
judges regularly are 'exposed . . . to emotional influences'.
16 Legal Realism was an intellectual movement anchored firmly in the USA, flourishing primarily between the
First and Second World Wars. See e.g. Brian Leiter, Nat7raliing J *_ pr-d Eay on A *e an L gal Realis
and Natzralii in Legal Philosop y (OUP 2007), Arthur L Corbin, 'The Law and the Judges' (1914) 3 Yale Rev
234, Charles Grove Haines, 'General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic
Influences in the Decisions of Judges' (1922) 17 Ill L Rev 96 (1922), John Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their
Function in the Process of Decision' (1931) 79 U Pa L Rev 833, Karl Llewellyn, 'Some Realism about Realism:
Responding to Dean Pound' (1931) 44 Harv L Rev 1222.
17 Benjamin N Cardozo, 'Jurisprudence', Lecture before Assoc Bar City of NY, in Selected Writing of Benami
Cardoo (Fallon Publications 1947) 7-46, 19.
18 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind (Brentano's 1930) 143.
19 UnitedStates v Ballard, 322 US 78, 93 94 (1944) (JacksonJ dissenting.
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Despite this dose of realism, however, the ideal of dispassion has remained steadfast. 20
For most, the sole point of acknowledging judicial emotion is to better control it.21 Thus,
Justice Sotomayor successfully defended herself by testifying that judges are 'not robots
[who] listen to evidence and don't have feelings. We have to recognise those feelings and put
them aside.'22 Realism may have modified the ideal but it did not fundamentally change its
underlying premises.
Why the ideal of dispassionate judging is misguided
That the script of judicial dispassion is deeply ingrained does not make it correct. This has
become increasingly clear as law has become more open to insights from other disciplines,
and as those disciplines - particularly psychology - have greatly expanded our understanding
of emotion. Emotion is not necessarily, or even usually, a pernicious influence in human life.
Other contributors to this special issue no doubt have made a similar argument, and I
therefore sketch it only briefly here.23 Contemporary affective psychology, with significant
backing from philosophical accounts, teaches the following: emotion reveals reasons,
motivates action in service of reasons, enables reason, and is educable.24
First, emotion reveals reasons because it relies on thoughts about states of the world. Every
emotion contains an underlying belief structure, known in psychology as a cognitive
appraisal. Fear, for example, reflects a cognitive appraisal that one faces 'an immediate,
concrete, and overwhelming physical danger', while guilt attends self-evaluation of having
'transgressed a moral imperative'. 25 The dichotomy between reason and emotion thus is
revealed to be far less than sharp. Knowing what a person is feeling reveals what they are
thinking, and both we and they can then evaluate those thoughts for accuracy and
normative justification. Second, emotion motivates action in service of reasons, for it prompts us
to respond to relevant states of the world in light of our goals. If a human being perceives
that a bear is approaching, 26 her fear focuses attention on the danger, prompts her to
evaluate its personal relevance - for example, its incompatibility with her desire not to be
mauled to death - and enables responsive action, including activating physical responses
that promote survival (like fleeing or screaming for help).27 Third, emotion enables reason.
Contemporary scientific research demonstrates the interdependence of emotional capacity
and substantive rationality, particularly in the areas of practical reason, self-regarding choice,
20 For example, during the nomination battle over Justice Sotomayor, one US senator insisted that judicial
empathy put 'nothing less than our liberty at stake' <http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfi?id 3959&wit id 515> (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch).
21 Only a small minority of post Realist judges and scholars have suggested that judicial emotion might be agood
thing. See, e.g. Brennan (n 14), IrvingJ Kaufman, 'The Anatomy of Decisionmaking' (1984) 53 Fordham L
Rev 1, 16.
22 14 July 2009 <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/07/sonia sotomayor hearing
transcript.html>.
23 A fuller account of contemporary research on emotion's nature and value may be found in Maroney (n 2) 'The
Persistent Cultural Script 642 52.
24 See, generally, Michael Lewis and Jeannette M Haviland Jones (eds), Hadbook of Emorionj (2nd edn, Guilford
Press 2000), Richard J Davidson et al (eds), Havdbook of Afectrive Scievces (OUP 2003), Richard D Lane and
Lynn Nadel (eds), Cognirive Neurosciece of Eorion (OUP 2000).
25 See, e.g. Richard S Lazarus, 'Universal Antecedents of the Emotions' in Paul Ekman and Richard J Davidson
(eds), The Nature Of Emoriov: F)nda neralQz rions (OUP 1994), 163, 164-5, table 1.
26 The approaching bear scenario is one that has been commonly invoked in emotion theory since the inception
of the field: William James, 'What is an Emotion?' (1884) 9 Mind 188 205, 190.
27 These propensities toward typified physical responses are called 'action readiness' or 'action tendencies'. See
David Sander and Klaus R Scherer (eds), The Oxford Compavion to Emorion and the Afectrive Sciences (OUP 2009)
1-2.
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and social judgment.28 Moral judgment, too, appears to be strongly intertwined with
emotional capacity.29 Finally, emotion is educable; not only can humans alter its external
manifestation (for example, by suppressing or forcing a smile), but the emotion itself can
be altered by changing one's underlying thoughts and goals. 30 As Richard Lazarus nicely
explained, though evolved 'biological universals link the f with the ten' - as where
perception of irrevocable loss leads to sadness - individual and cultural factors 'affect the
jf'by determining what circumstances are thought to constitute such a state of affairs. 31 In
addition to explaining human emotional diversity, this flexibility creates space for emotional
growth and change.
Taken together, these findings show that the traditional legal story casting emotion as
stubbornly irrational is simply not true. These lessons about emotion are as true for judges as for
other humans. Literal elimination of judicial emotion is not just unrealistic as a goal; 32 it is
destructive as a value. The inquiry therefore must shift, asking not how judges can be rid of
emotion but rather how they can cope with it - and potentially derive something of value from it.
Judicial emotion regulation
As the prior discussion makes clear, under both the traditional account of judging and its
post-Realist iteration we expect judges to regulate emotion, either by preventing its
emergence or by walling off its influence. The presumed object of such efforts is to attain
an emotionles s state when performing a judicial function. Taking emotion research seriously
requires us to abandon a rigid commitment to that object. It does not, however, require us
to abandon a commitment to emotion regulation. On the contrary, it counsels us more fully
to embrace emotion regulation as a critical judicial skill.
Emotion regulation refers to any attempt to influence what emotions we have, when we
have them, and how those emotions are experienced or expressed. 33 It is difficult to
overstate regulation's importance. Recognising that emotion is of enormous value does not
signify that it must be allowed free rein.34 Emotion often helps us achieve our goals, such
as escaping bear maulings, but this is not always the case. Fear sometimes can paralyse;
sadness can overwhelm; love can blind. Emotion can reveal undesirable thoughts, as when
28 The best known of these studies (which continue to proliferate) are by Antonio Damasio, Antoine Bechara
and their collaborators. See, generally, Antonio R Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and th Hp' an
Brain (Grosset Putnam 1994), Antonio Damasio, The Feeliig of What Happens: Bo and Emotion in rh Making
of Con opjneii (Harvest Books 1999), Antoine Bechara et al, 'Characterization of the Decision making
Deficits of Patients with Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Lesions' (2000) 123 Brain 2189 202. See also S W
Anderson et al, 'Impairments of Emotion and Real world Complex Behavior following Childhood or Adult
onset Damage to Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex' (2006) 12 J Int Neuropsychol Soc 224, 224, Terry A
Maroney, 'Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding", and the Criminal Defendanf (2006) 43 Am
Crim L Rev 1375, 1392 97.
29 Walter Sinnott Armstrong (ed), Moral Pychology: The N erosfin ] Moraliv: Emotion, Brain Disorder, and
D evelopnr, vol 3 (MIT Press 2008), Dacher Keltner et al, 'Emotions as Moral Intuitions' in Joseph P Forgas
(ed), Aft in Social Thinking and Beharior (Psychology Press 2006) 162 75, Jesse Prinz, 'The Emotional Basis
of Moral Judgments' (2006) 9 Phil Explorations 29, <wwwwjh.harvard.edu/-igreene/> (Moral Cognition
Lab), Liane Young et al, 'Damage to Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Impairs Judgment of Harmftl Intent'
(2010) 65 Neuron 845 51.
30 JamesJ Gross and Ross A Thompson, 'Emotional Regulation: Conceptual Foundations' in James J Gross (ed),
Handbook of Emoion Regulation (Guilford Press 2007) 3 24, 13 15.
31 Lazarus (n 25) 167 8.
32 In the prior articles I have demonstrated at length why the ideal is unrealistic, by systematically culling evidence
of judicial emotion including (inter alia) sadness, joy, anger and fear.
33 James J Gross, 'Antecedent and Response Focused Emotion Regulation: Divergent Consequences for
Experience, Expression, and Physiology' (1998) 74J of Personality and Soc Psychol 224.
34 Jennifer S Beer and Michael V Lombardo, 'Insights into Emotion Regulation from Neuropsychology' in Gross (n 30).
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one feels jealousy rater than pride at a child's achievement, or unworty goals, as when one
delights in the misfortune of others. At times it is important to show one's emotions - for
example, by smiling proudly at the child - while at others just the opposite is called for -
for example, by feigning courage to dissuade a possible assailant. Emotion is adaptive, but
so too is the capacity to regulate it in response to varied environmental demands and in
service of accurate beliefs and worty objectives. 35 Such capacity is a hallmark of what is
popularly known as 'emotional intelligence'. 36 Indeed, Aristotle's vision of the virtuous man
- one who has the right emotions, in the right situation, for the right reasons, and to the
right degree37 - is now a philosophical and psychological article of faith.
Judges in their private lives, of course, can strive for such emotional virtue. Far more
important for legal theorists, though, is the realisation that judges can do so in their
professional lives as well. Thanks to the pioneering work of the US sociologist Arlie
Hochschild, we may recognise this effort as a form of emotional labour, or the work of
regulating emotion so as to conform to the expectations of one's profession and
workplace.38 Though empirical research is scant, all indications are that judges do perform
such emotional labour. Surveyed Australian magistrates, for example, reported expending
significant energy coping with emotional challenges. One described his caseload as a
constant parade of 'absolute misery'; another spoke of having difficulty at the end of the
day 'walking away and erasing everything about everything I've heard about families and the
stress that they're under, [and] the treatment children have been dished out'.39 Importantly,
these and other judges4 0 find this emotional labour difficult. Much of that difficulty stems
from two intertwined causes. The first is the unrealistic expectation of dispassion. US state
court judges complained that because the legal system tends 'to strip away emotions', they
were becoming 'insulated and numb'. 41 The second is the lack of available models. As one
Australian magistrate put it bluntly:
[t1here's two things that can happen to you. Either you're going to remain a
decent person and become terribly upset by it all because your emotions ... are
being pricked by all of this constantly or you're going to... grow a skin on you
as thick as a rhino, in which case I believe you're going to become an inadequate
judicial officer because once you lose the ... feeling for humanity you can't...
do the job. 4 2
35 Vanderkerckhove et al, 'Regulating Emotions: Culture, Social Necessity, and Biological Inheritance' in Marie
Vanderkerckhove et al (eds), Regulating Emorion: Culture, Social Necei, and BiologicalInheritance (Blackwell 2008),
1 12, p 3 (regulation serves to 'fine tune' our emotional system to 'socio cultural contexts), Richard J
Davidson et al, 'Neural Bases of Emotion Regulation in Nonhuman Primates and Humans' in Gross (n 30),
47-68, 47 (regulation provides 'important flexibility to our behavioral repertoire).
36 Daniel Goleman, Emorionalitelig Pc: W y it Can MarterMor than IQ (Bloomsbury 1996), Paula M Niedenthal
et al (eds), Pychology of Emotion: leit onal, Experiential, and Cogniiv Approaches (Psychology Press 2006) 162.
37 James R Averill, Anger and Aggr ion An Esqy on Emorion (Springer Verlag 1982) (quoting Aristotle,
'Nicomachean Ethics' (1106b20) in R McKeon (ed), The Basi Works of Arisrore (Random House 1941).
38 Arlie R Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commeria/izarion of Hzan Feeling (University of California Press 1983),
see also Vanda L Zammuner and Cristina Galli, 'The Relationship with Patients: "Emotional Labor" and its
Correlates in Hospital Employees' in C E J Hartel et al (eds), Emotionj in Organiarional Behatior (Psychology
Press 2004) 254, 251-83.
39 Australian norms, like those of the USA, dictate that judges 'not be swayed' by emotion and deem any
emotionally influenced judicial action 'irrational': Sharon Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, 'Magistrates'
Everyday Work and Emotional Labour' (2005) 32(4) Journal of Law and Society 590.
40 See also Mary Lay Schuster and Amy Propen, 'Degrees of Emotion: Judicial Responses to Victim Impact
Statements' (2010) 6 Law, Culture and Humanities 75 (reporting similar findings among judges in Minnesota).
41 Ibid 89.
42 Anleu and Mack (n 39) 612.
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As this ci de coeur suggests, we have stranded our judges. Not only have we tethered
them to an unrealistic goal, but we have commanded them to carry out a highly
sophisticated psychological task with no guidance as to how. I already have offered a
solution to the first problem, which is to abandon pretensions of dispassion. The
solution to the second problem is nowhere near as straightforward. Fortunately, we
have an excellent guide - a robust, well-validated body of contemporary psychological
research on emotion regulation. 43
As I have elaborated at greater length elsewhere, applying this body of research to the
judging context yields a promising model for judicial emotion regulation, one that
encourages judges to engage with their emotions rather than avoid, suppress, or deny them.
I cannot do full justice to that model here, but I will outline its fundamentals.
Emotion regulation may be pursued by way of a diverse array of strategies, all designed
to change either the emotion-eliciting situation, one's thoughts about that situation, or one's
responses to that situation. 44 Each strategy has distinct costs, benefits and effects on
decision-making.45 All have both occasional utility and maladaptive manifestations, the
latter of which may include causing paradoxical or unintended effects. 46 Simplistic ideas
about emotion tend to lead to simplistic regulatory choices, which often will prove a poor
fit with a complicated reality.47 Poor regulatory choices can be remarkably impervious to
correction through experience. Finally, the most critical regulatory capacity is flexibility.48
A sound model for judicial emotion regulation identifies relatively stable attributes of
judging that render particular strategies generally more or less well suited to that context and
prioritises those with greatest inherent flexibility. That model indicates the following about
the major categories of regulatory strategy, presented here in descending order from the
most promising to the most maladaptive.
The most promising judicial emotion regulation strategy is cognitive reappraisal.
Reappraisal involves changing one's thoughts in order to feel a desired emotion or avoid an
undesired one. Imagine fear upon seeing a snake. To reappraise that fear requires a change
in one's perception (it's actually a curvy stick), evaluative judgment (that type of snake is
harmless), or goal (I don't value my physical safety). So, for example, a judge may decide to
think about a neglectful parent not as a person who is trying to harm her child, but rather
as someone who is not presently equipped to handle parenting. That mental shift might spur
compassion (rather than, say, disgust or anger) and focus the judge on a new goal, such as
determining whether and how the legal system could help the parent do better. Cognitive
reappraisal can also help judges achieve relative emotional neutrality. Experiments have
consistently shown that people asked to view disturbing images 'with the detached interest
of a medical professional' and to 'think about them objectively and analytically rather than
43 James J Gross, 'Preface' in Gross (n 30) xi xiv and figure PI1 Sander L Koole, 'The Psychology of Emotion
Regulation: An Integrative Review' (2009) 23 Cognition and Emotion 4, 5.
44 Gross and Thompson (n 30) 10. Another common strategy is to alter one's subjective and physical state with
drugs and alcohol.Josh M Cisler et al, Emotion Regulation and the Anxiety Disorders: An Integrative Review'
(2010) 32 J Psychopathology and Behav Assessment 68, 75. Because this tactic is so obviously off limits to
on duty judges, I do not discuss it.
45 Renata M Heilman et al, 'Emotion Regulation and Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty' (2010) 10
Emotion 257.
46 See, e.g. <http://selfcontrol.psych.lsa.umich.edu/>, Gross (n 33) 224, Koole (n 43) 6.
47 Tanja Wranik et al, Intelligent Emotion Regulation: Is Knowledge Power?' in Gross (n 30) 393-407, 400, 403,
Koole (n 43) 22.
48 Nancy Eisenberg et al, Effortful Control and its Socioemotional Consequences' in Gross (n 30) 287 306, 290,
James J Gross, 'Emotion Regulation: Affective, Cognitive, and Social Consequences' (2002) 39
Psychophysiology 281, 289.
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as personally, or in any way emotionally relevant' feel and display fewer emotions than
control subjects.49 Such reappraisal has virtually no costs; indeed, it appears to enhance
memory. Adopting such a professional attitude is a form of cognitive pre-commitment that
changes how the mind processes stimuli. To a doctor, a wound becomes less disgusting than
informational; focusing on its informational value for diagnosis and treatment allows the
doctor to bypass any disgust reaction. Similarly, judges can learn to treat vivid stimuli as
professionally relevant rater than personally provocative.
Reappraisal is the strategy that most closely conforms to our present expectations of
judges. However, to be effective consistently and over the long term it must be
acknowledged, trained, and practised. Further, such reappraisal cannot always be relied
upon, for judges will encounter situations that cause even the most practised
professionalism to crack. Consider a recent video posted on YouTube of a judge screaming
angrily at a mother accused of child neglect. Interviewed afterwards, he confessed, 'I
reacted humanly; I try not to do that.' 50
Another strategy that often will be highly adaptive for judges is disclosure. Disclosure
usually takes the form of talking or writing about one's emotions and the experiences that
prompted them. As highly stigmatised as judicial emotion disclosure is, judges might be
expected to do this privately (with family and friends) if at all. Even such private disclosure
is likely to be productive: though thinking and talking about emotions does not generally
lessen their intensity, it enhances self-knowledge, allowing judges to build 'a specific and
detailed data bank' about their emotions from which they can draw lessons. 51 Disclosure
also draws others into that evaluative process and, over time, helps one live with emotion
more comfortably. However, private disclosure is unlikely to be sufficient. Sharing
emotional challenges with other judges would be particularly beneficial, strengthening
camaraderie and facilitating mutual support.52 After all, who could have more insight than
another judge? Unfortunately, peer disclosure appears rare. One prominent judge told me
that he had never had such a discussion with judicial colleagues and did not think they
would be open to such conversation. Another US federal judge wrote that he had once
broached the subject of the emotional difficulty of criminal sentencing with a senior
colleague, only to receive a vague assurance that it would 'get easier'. 53 Loosening the
expectation of dispassion would make peer disclosure more likely, as judges would be less
worried about harming their reputations by admitting emotional reactions.
Public disclosure may also be beneficial. Though it is rare, judges occasionally publicly
acknowledge emotion: both of the previously mentioned judges wrote articles doing so7
and judges occasionally let emotion show in written opinions, often in dissent. Public
disclosure has many potential benefits. It would normalise judicial emotion and draw the
broader community into the emotion-evaluation process. However, some caution is
warranted. As discussed in the section to follow, disclosure's benefits are likely to vary
49 J P Hayes et al, 'Staying Cool when Things Get Hot: Emotion Regulation Modulates Neural Mechanisms of
Memory Encoding (2011) 4 Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 1 10, Jane M Richards and James J Gross,
'Emotion Regulation and Memory: The Cognitive Costs of Keeping One's Cool' (2000) 79 Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 410.
50 Maroney, 'Angry Judges' (n 2).
51 Pierre Philippot, Aurore Neumann and Nathalie Vrielynck, 'Emotion Information Processing and Affect
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considerably depending on the judge's objectives, the manner in which it is done, and the
emotion at issue; expressions of anger, disgust and contempt may be uniquely dangerous.
A strategy that is often necessary, but highly costly, is behamoural suppression. Behavioural
suppression involves inhibition of expressive behaviour, such as facial expression (e.g.
smiling), verbalisation (e.g. groaning), or bodily movement (e.g. cringing). Physical
impassivity is generally what we expect of judges. That expectation is not entirely irrational,
for it serves at least two important purposes. A judge who projects little emotional
responsivity models good courtroom decorum, which others may mimic.55 Such a judge
also blocks others from perceiving her appraisals. Imagine a judge who believes that a
witness is shading the truth, but knows that a jury, not she, is entrusted with making the
credibility determination. The judge needs to mask any anger, disgust, or contempt, lest the
jury see (and presumably rely upon) what it broadcasts about the judge's opinion of the
witness. Unfortunately, though, behavioural suppression is effortful and comes at a cost.
Suppression consumes cognitive resources, impairing memory and one's ability to engage in
logical reasoning 56 As one prominent contemporary scholar of emotion regulation
summed it up, behavioural suppression makes a person temporarily 'stupider'. 57 Nor do
these costs tend to pay off in terms of directly changing emotion. Not only does
behavioural suppression not lessen the intensity of negative emotion, it may magnify
physiological responses. 58 Adopting a 'poker face' thus is beneficial only where it serves
some critical judicial function, such as maintaining order; it is not a steady state toward
which judges always should aspire.
Judges have limited ability to engage in another common strategy: situation selection and
modfication. Situation selection involves choosing or avoiding situations because of their
anticipated emotional effect; modification refers to altering the situation's features. An
example of judicial situation selection would be to choose the court in which one serves. A
judge might avoid the family court if she believes that exposure to distressed families will be
depressing, or seek appointment to the probate court if she believes that she will feel pride in
helping grieving families settle their affairs. Such self-selection might be beneficial if the
judge's predictions are accurate - and there is reason to believe they may not be, unless
preceded by experience; a judge seeking to transfer out of the family court, for example, is on
better footing in this regard than one seeking to avoid it. But few judges have such a luxury,
and many serve in courts of general jurisdiction in any event. Judges may also try to exert
control over the cases they hear. This strategy is likely to be even less possible. Judges can
recuse themselves from cases only for specific reasons, such as when it implicates a personal
interest; avoiding emotion is not one of those reasons. 59 Few courts have discretionary
jurisdiction, and even those that do - like the US Supreme Court - cannot forever avoid
deciding certain issues. But if a judge generally cannot avoid emotional situations, she might
be able to modify them. For example, she might schedule gruesome evidentiary testimony on
a day that will permit frequent breaks, or delegate aggravating tasks - such as interacting wit
55 Anleu and Mack (n 39) 614.
56 Barnaby D Dunn et al, 'The Consequences of Effortful Emotion Regulation when Processing Distressing
Material: A Comparison of Suppression and Acceptance' (2009) 47 Behavior Res and Therapy 761, 764 n 2
R Baumeister et al, 'Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?' (1998) 74J Personality and Social
Psychol 1252, Jane M Richards and James J Gross, 'Personality and Emotional Memory: How Regulating
Emotion Impairs Memory for Emotional Events' (2006) 40 J Res in Personality 631.
57 Conversation of Terry A Maroney with James J Gross (5 March 2010).
58 James J Gross and R W Levenson, 'Emotional Suppression: Physiology, Self report, and Expressive Behavior'
(1993) 64J Personality and Social Psychol 970 86.
59 Only rarely, when a judge's emotional reaction to a party rises to the level of threatening fundamental fairness,
will recusal be appropriate: r ieky v US, 510 US 540, 555 56 (1994).
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obnoxious attorneys on scheduling issues - to a clerk. It is reasonable to assume that judges
routinely make such small accommodations, with little impact on the quality of judging.
However, courtroom management responsibilities may foreclose many modifications. The
judge may not, for example, decline to set scheduling orders with bothersome attorneys. Nor
may she walk out of the courtroom to take a break whenever she wants one, particularly if
she has a busy docket or is sitting on a judicial panel. 60 Further, judges often must face
emotionally vivid stimuli so as to control the extent to which others are exposed to it. For
example, if the judge must decide whether the jury should be permitted to view a gruesome
autopsy photo, she must look closely at the photo herself Avoiding and altering emotionally
vivid situations therefore is only of limited use to judges.
Atentional depiqyment and distraction are closely related to avoidance and modification, but
take place internally: one modifies emotional response by refusing to attend to the provocative
stimulus. Instead, one looks at or thinks about something else, reads, hums a song, and so on.
This approach will virtually never be appropriate. It is not hard to see why: if we expect
anything of our judges, it is to pay attention to all relevant aspects of a case, including the
unpleasant ones. For similar reasons, mindfulness is not obviously compatible with judging.
Drawn from the Buddhist tradition, mindftlness emphasises observation and acceptance of
mental phenomena, including emotion. 61 At the risk of oversimplification, its explicitly
nonjudgmental approach might conflict with the task of a judge - that is, to judge. To be sure,
attentional deployment, distraction, and mindftlness might all have some place in the judge's
regulatory toolbox. Sometimes the judge will have the luxury (say, in chambers) of taking a
mental break by playing sudoku; she might be able to introduce calming music, or glance at a
picture of her family; and the precepts of mindftlness might help her judge herself less
harshly if she is not always able to manage her emotions exactly as she would like.
Finally, seeking directly to suppress emotional expetience is always likely to be maladaptive for
judges, despite the fact that it is encouraged by the ideal of dispassion. Suppression can take
various forms: 'steeling oneself', as when one resolves in advance simply not to feel any
emotion in response to an anticipated stimulus; denial, as when one pretends that an
emotion never existed or that it has been extinguished; and literal repression, described by
Freud as a process by which unwanted emotional memories are displaced to the
subconscious. Experiential suppression is a bad bet for a variety of reasons, the first being
that it seldom works. Emotions cannot easily be headed off at the pass just by willing them
to be so.62 This is particularly true for judges, who cannot help but encounter novel, often
extreme, situations for which they find themselves unprepared. 63 Moreover, experiential
suppression, like its behavioural counterpart, comes at a high cost. It impairs logic, self-
control and social judgment. 64 Pushing emotions out of mind also can result in ironic
increase in their intensity, particularly when under stress or cognitive load (as judges usually
60 One judge told me that he did sometimes simply walk out so he could pull himself together, however, he was
the sole judge in a small, rural jurisdiction and had virtually total control over his courtroom. Maroney,
'Emotional Regulation' (n 2) 1525.
61 Koole (n 43) 27.
62 Richard Chambers, Eleonora Gullone and Nicholas B Allen, 'Mindful Emotion Regulation: An Integrative
Review' (2009) 29 Clinical Psychol Rev 560, 566, Koole (n 43) 6 ('people may still display unwanted emotions
despite their best efforts).
63 See, e.g. it re SkylerM, 2007 WL 2109797 (Cal App 2 Dist) (All my years of sitting here, I don't think I've ever
seen a doctor cry on the witness stand.).
64 Daniel M Wegner, White Bears and Other Unwanted Thought : Suppression, Obsession, and the Pychology of Melntal
Contrrnl(Guildford Press 1989) 81-82, Iris B Mauss, Silvia A Bunge and James J Gross, 'Culture and Automatic
Emotion Regulation' in Vandekerckhove et al (n 51).
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are). 65 Emotional suppression can harden into a repressive coping style, associated with
poor health outcomes 66 and arrogance. 67 The former is relevant to judges primarily as
people (though it raises the prospect of longevity costs), but the latter clearly is of great
concern for judges qua judges.
In sum, judicial emotion is best regulated not by turning away from it, but rather by
turning toward it. The ideal of judicial dispassion encourages overconfidence in the ability
of judges to eliminate emotion by willing themselves not to feel it, denying that they do, and
controlling its outward expression. 68 Judicial emotion suppression is the sort of
maladaptive regulatory cycle that resists self-correction, particularly since it is societally
reinforced. Instead, we ought to encourage judges to prepare realistically for inevitable
emotional challenges, process and respond thoughtfully to any emotions they may have, and
selectively integrate those emotions into their decisional processes. The ideal of the
dispassionate judge thus might be replaced by that of the emotionally well-regulated judge.
Judicial anger: an illustrative example
To be successful, a new model for thinking about judicial emotion must be both
theoretically sound and functional on the applied level. I therefore will briefly demonstrate
how it may be applied to judicial anger.69 Anger is a fitting focus, for it is both one of the
most common judicial emotions and the one judges feel most free to express. Written
opinions, news reports, new media sources such as YouTube, and judges' self-reports amply
demonstrate the ubiquity of anger. Lawyers are the most common targets, followed by
litigants (including criminal defendants), witnesses, and other judges. The most common
triggers for judicial anger are incompetence (particularly on the part of lawyers), disrespect,
unwarranted harm inflicted on others, and lying.
Anger is quintessentially judicial. 70 It follows assessment that a rational agent has
committed an unwarranted wrongdoing, either because she intended to harm or was
neglectful where care was warranted. 71 Once triggered, anger both generates a desire to
affix blame and assign punishment and facilitates actions necessary to carry out that desire.
From this perspective it is hard to see how judges could fail to feel anger, or how they could
do without it, given the rather precise match between its core attributes and much of what
we ask judges to do. Certainly, judges might be able to render many decisions in a cold,
clinical manner and reach equivalent outcomes. 72 But if valuing the judges' humanity means
anything - if we retain a strong intuition that we would choose a judge over a decision-
generating robot - it means retaining a capacity for righteous anger. A judge ought to care
about her work and the affected persons. If she does, it would be impossible for her to feel
65 Wegner (n 64) 122 24, George Loewenstein, 'Affect Regulation and Affective Forecasting' in Gross (n 30)
180 203, 190 91, Niedenthal et al n 36) 176.
66 Chambers et al (n 62) 564.
67 Koole (n 43) 20.
68 Wegner (n 64) 15. Overconfidence discourages self examination and learning. See e.g. Stuart Oskamp,
'Overconfidence in Case study judgments' in Daniel Kahneman et al (eds), Jitdge ur Un iin: Heutrisc
audBiases (CUP 1982) 287 93.
69 A far more extended treatment, including a detailed description of specific episodes of judicial anger, may be
found in Maroney, 'Angry Judges' (n 2).
70 Indeed, in many religious traditions deities are thought of as righteously angry judges. Michael Potegal and
Raymond W Novaco, 'A Brief History of Anger', in Michael Potegal et al (eds), Ia eruatioualHaudbook of Ager
(Springer 2010) 9 24.
71 James R Averill, Auger audAggresiou: Au Eiiq ou Emotiou (Springer Verlag 1982) 248-49.
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40 50/1963).
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(1)
nothing when determining that a fellow human has raped a child, cheated a pensioner,
violated a direct order to produce vital documents, lied under oath and so on. As Robert C
Solomon put it, we cannot 'have a sense of justice without the capacity and willingness to
be personally outraged'. 7
3
But anger seems also to pose a danger to neutral, careful decision -making, a quality as
valued in a judge as a sense of justice.74 Anger tends to trigger relatively shallow patterns
of thought, increasing reliance on heuristics and stereotypes. It can lead to premature
decisions, as the angry person tends to be very certain of her judgment and may resist new
or conflicting evidence; it also has been shown to increase punitive, perhaps even
disproportionately punitive, actions. Anger triggered by one cause can easily bleed over into
unrelated contexts. Finally, it can manifest itself in aggression and violence. Each of these
characteristics is deeply threatening to competent judicial performance.
Judicial anger must therefore be carefully regulated. Because it is so common, the US
courts have developed a rough template for its post hoc assessment. Some judicial anger is
considered right and proper (for example, being 'appropriately angered' by a defendant who
made false accusations of government misconduct in order to waste resources);75 most is
thought to fall within an unfortunate but understandable buffer zone (including
'expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the
bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal
judges, sometimes display');76 and a small slice is deemed improper, because it bespeaks
bias,77 prompts carelessness or haste,78 suggests a poor judicial temperament,79 or
demonstrates unfitness to serve.80 These hindsight categories are functional enough,
though they have a 'we-know-it-when-we-see-it' quality. But what is most needed is a system
for shaping judicial anger experience and expression in the first instance. Emotion
regulation serves that function.
First, if the judge knows she is going to encounter an angering situation - such as a
criminal sentencing of a defiant and 'reprehensible' person - she can prepare realistically by
acknowledging that he is going to make her angry and choosing a response pattern in advance.
She may think carefully about her professional role, which - she may decide - includes
expressing anger on behalf of the public and any victims, making victims feel welcome, and
denying the defendant the satisfaction of having 'gotten to' her. If those are her goals, she
may decide to maintain a poker face while the defendant speaks, treat victims with warm
courtesy, and read prepared remarks so she can control exactly how she communicates anger.
Executing such a plan will be easier the more accurately the judge predicts how the hearing is
likely to unfold. Judge Mark Bennett, for example, consistently encounters 'infuriatingly
insincere nonsense from sophisticated, highly educated white collar defendants'. 81 Experience
with such recurrent triggers helps the judge formulate realistic anger regulation plans.
73 Robert C Solomon, A PazionforJuric Emorionjsaid the Odgui of the Social Coutract (Addison Wesley 1990) 34, 42.
74 For a thorough review of anger's behavior effects, see Paul M Litvak, 'Fuel in the Fire: How Anger Impacts
Judgment and Decision Making' in Potegal et al (n 70), Jennifer S Lerner and Larissa Z Tiedens, 'Portrait of
the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal Tendencies Shape Anger's Influence on Cognition' (2006) 19 J
Behav Dec Making 115, 117.
75 Campbell v US, 2010 WL 1379992 (SD West Virginia, 10 March 2010).
76 Liteky v US, 510 US 540, 555 6 (1994).
77 Hardjou vAuderon, 300 F Supp 2d 690 (SD Indiana 2004).
78 Seizt Group v Shell Oil, 559 F 3d 888 (8th Cir 2009).
79 McBgde v Committee t Review Circuit Cou, cil Conduct and Diabiti Orders of Judik al Con ereoce of US, 264 F 3d 52,
54 55 (DC 2001).
80 T re Sloop, 946 So 2d 1046, 1051, 1053, 1057 (Fla 2007) (per curiam).
81 Bennett (n 53) 26.
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Life being unpredictable, these plans will not always pan out. One defendant surprised his
judge by spitting in her face;82 another mocked the judge; 83 another lobbed extremely profane
insults.84 Judges therefore need a plan to cope with anger that could not be (or simply was
not) avoided. Cognitive reappraisal is critical here as well. It can help judges discern (a) what
their anger is about, and whether it (b) rests on an accurate assessment of reality, (c) reflects
proper judicial values, and (d) can or should be rethought. For example, if a judge reacts
angrily because a litigant appears to be violating an order to sit down, she could consider the
possibility that the litigant is simply confused. 85 If she is angry at an attorney who announces
that he has prevailed against her on appeal, she may remind herself that he had a right to
appeal and that the legal system depends on her acceptance of such judgments. 86
Reappraisal requires self-awareness, which is beneficial for other reasons as well. A judge
who is both self-aware and aware of the common effects of anger will be in a far better
position to regulate her behaviour. She will be in a better position to suppress angry
behaviours when appropriate. If she feels like she has a short fuse on a given day, she may
be more careful than usual in asking herself if she is truly angry at thisperson for this incident,
or whether anger is being displaced. A judge who sees herself precipitously declaring tihe
proceedings 'done' and imposing the harshest possible sanction might realise that she needs
to take a minute (or more) to gather herself before finalising any decisions.87
Self-awareness is also furthered through productive disclosure. By discussing their
feelings with trusted others and peers, judges can enlist support in recognising what tends
to make them angry, how they tend to act, and how anger has helped or hindered their
judging. Public disclosure can help as well. When Judge Gregory O'Brien Jr wrote an article
discussing the causes of his frequent anger and how he learned to overcome it, it
represented an important step in lessening that anger and lengthening his career - and it
helped the public to better understand the challenges judges face.88
In contrast, seeking to suppress or deny anger is a dangerous path. Judges have been
removed from the bench for so aggressively trying to tamp down anger that they blow up
in extreme and unpredictable ways.89 The health risks of emotion suppression are
particularly severe for this emotion, and the callous arrogance that suppression breeds is of
special concern given judges' extraordinary power over people's lives.
Here, a special note of caution is warranted: that anger suppression is bad does not
signify that unfettered anger disclosure is good. Making anger known can be destructive in
a way that showing other emotions, like sadness, generally cannot. Consider the Wisconsin
judge who publicly referred to his colleague as a 'total bitch', 90 or the federal judge who
stunned the audience at an oral argument by accusing a colleague of hogging time and
82 'How to Piss Off the Judge' (13 August 2009) <www.youtube.com/watch?v uCNo4ky6GXE>.
83 'Judge, Defendant Spar During Sentencing' (Associated Press, 24 March 2009)
<www.youtube.com/watch?v X7Z4LQ06B58>.
84 Mary Lay Schuster and Amy Propen, 'Degrees of Emotion: Judicial Responses to Victim Impact Statements'
(2010) 6 Law, Culture and Humanities 75, at 93.
85 <http://wn.com/Judge-loses-it on-cam,jails man for sittingtoo-slow>.
86 Aoderon v Sheppard, 856 F 2d 741 (6th Cir 1988).
87 Seti Group v heOil, 559 F 3d 888 (8th Cir 2009).
88 Gregory C O'Brien Jr, 'Confessions of an Angry Judge' (2004) 87 Judicature 251, 252.
89 In re Sloop, 946 So 2d 1046, 1051, 1053, 1057 (Fla 2007) (per curiam).
90 'Justices' Feud gets Physical' Milyaukee Wlzsjoni * Jo'zan el (Milwaukee, 25 June 2011).
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(1)
suggesting that he leave the courtroom. 91 Anger also appears to be distinct from many
other emotions in that giving it voice can increase its potency.92 Judges can come to enjoy
the sense of power, confidence, and control anger brings. The case law is replete with
judges who repeatedly belittle, abuse, insult, humiliate and lash out at litigants, attorneys and
even colleagues, and these incidents are typically infused with great anger. These dangers
highlight the great importance of cultivating judicial anger-management skills.
In short, competent anger regulation will help a judge prepare realistically for anger, for
it is certain to come; respond thoughtfully to anger, for she may be able to rethink the
situation or select a different response; and integrate anger selectively, by making use of it
when it is helpful to do so and by finding other outlets - such as private disclosure to a
trusted colleague - when it is not.
Conclusion: toward a new ideal of emotionally intelligent judging
This article has briefly set forth the fundamental flaws in the ideal of judicial dispassion,
made the case that judges are best advised to engage with rather than suppress their
emotions, and demonstrated how taking such an approach can maximise beneficial
iterations of judicial anger while minimising destructive ones.
Unfortunately, neither law schools nor judicial institutes routinely address these issues,
let alone provide the necessary training this appears to be as true in the British Isles as in
the USA. The US medical profession, facing a strikingly similar challenge, has begun to do
so, with uniformly positive results. Though the research remains preliminary, it seems that
more emotionally intelligent doctors are not only happier, more well-adjusted people, but
better doctors as well. 93 One highly promising move would be to develop a parallel
approach for judicial education. A comparative approach might also yield important
insights. Particularly in the Continental system, judges are more coherently trained than in
the US and in the British Isles, where judges train as lawyers and are either appointed or
elected straight out of practice. The career-track model of judging therefore may provide
more natural opportunities for training. It is also worth considering whether cultural
differences might reliably track differences in judicial emotion and its regulation. In addition
to pilot work that has begun in Australia,94 a research duo has just begun to undertake an
ambitious project to observe and analyse judges' emotions in Sweden. Were such studies to
both proliferate and coordinate, the potential would be enormous.
Judicial emotion is truly terra nova for legal scholars, psychologists, sociologists, and so
many others. One hopes that more brave judges will step forward to share their experience
and help us navigate this terrain. Let's go.
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